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GROUP LITIGATION UNDER FOREIGN LEGAL
SYSTEMS: VARIATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES TO
AMERICAN CLASS ACTIONS
Edward F. Sherman
INTRODUCTION
The class action is a uniquely American procedural device. It al-
lows plaintiffs to sue not only for injury done to themselves but on
behalf of other persons similarly situated for injury done to them. It
serves the interests of economy by not having to try the same issues
again and again in separate cases. It also serves the interests of consis-
tency and finality by avoiding the possibility of inconsistent outcomes
in separate trials of similar cases and resolving all claims in a single
case that is binding on all class members. On the other hand, if there
is insufficient commonality of interest between the class members,
class treatment can deprive them and the defendant of an individual-
ized determination of their disputes. It also affects the bargaining
power of the parties, enabling plaintiffs to command more litigation
resources by combining their cases and giving them much greater lev-
erage by compounding the defendant's risk of loss.'
Other countries have eyed the American class action with both ad-
miration and suspicion. There is recognition that the traditional sin-
gle-party model of adjudication is not well-suited to situations today
when the claims of many individuals arise from the same basic con-
duct of a defendant. Not only does this involve a waste of judicial
resources, but it can also effectively deny legal recourse when the cost
of individual litigation would exceed any possible recovery. 2 Until re-
cently, the latter concern was tempered in many developed countries
1. "[C]ertification dramatically affects the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies
and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it more
likely that a defendant would be found liable and results in significantly higher damages
awards." Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.. 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996). See also In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Grady v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc.. 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (noting that class action certification may force defendants to "bet the
company").
2. The dual missions of the class action rules were described by Professor Benjamin Kaplan.,
Reporter of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, as
(1) to reduce units of litigation by bringing under one umbrella what might otherwise
be many separate but duplicating actions: (2) even at the expense of increasing litiga-
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by the availability of welfare programs and administrative remedies
for injuries that are often handled through private litigation in the
United States.3 In addition, many countries had generous governmen-
tal legal aid programs making access to the courts available for indi-
viduals with limited means. But as the scope of welfare and legal aid
programs has declined in the last several decades, the American mar-
ket approach to fashioning legal remedies and permitting aggregation
of claims has taken on added attraction abroad.
Many countries have procedures that permit, in certain circum-
stances, standing to sue in the place of others, aggregation of similar
claims, or suits filed in some kind of representative capacity. How-
ever, such procedures fall short of the broad sweep of the contempo-
rary American class action with its incentives to litigate on behalf of a
class. "Representative proceedings" have been available under En-
glish court rules for over two hundred years, but have been used infre-
quently as a result of early narrow interpretation by the courts and
limitations on group-wide determination of damages. 4 Australia and
Canada had similar practices and in the last several decades have
adopted broader rules more clearly modeled on the American class
action. 5 They have not, however, experienced the same mushrooming
of class action practice as in the United States. This might be ex-
plained by such legal differences as the absence of juries, a career judi-
ciary, less activist and entrepreneurial attorneys, and the "loser-pays"
rule for shifting attorneys' fees. As will be discussed, Australia and
Canada both rely on and deviate from American class action prece-
dents and practice and offer a useful source for comparison with U.S.
procedures.
Most European countries eschewed American class action practice
until quite recently, although some had distinctive procedures permit-
ting expanded standing and aggregation through "group litigation."
In 1998, a directive of the European Parliament and Council required
the member countries to implement certain forms of group litigation
by the end of the year 2000, and that Directive is being implemented
in different ways by the various European Union (EU) countries. A
number of non-EU countries have also experimented with, or are con-
sidering, broader rules to permit group litigation or representative
tion, to provide means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.
Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to "The Class Action"-A Symposium. 10 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 497. 497 (1969).
3. See generally CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW (1992).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 79-97.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 98-157.
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suits, including Brazil, India, and Indonesia. 6 Consideration of those
developments is beyond the scope of this Article, but they too offer
interesting sources for comparative study.
While other countries display a growing interest in American class
action practice for litigation arising from defective products, deceptive
trade practices, and environmental conditions, they tend to react neg-
atively to the American litigation landscape. Horror stories about an
overly litigious society, entrepreneurial plaintiff attorneys, runaway
jury verdicts, abusive class action practices, and legal blackmail
through meritless suits that drive up business costs are well-known
abroad. 7 Whether or not such stories convey an accurate picture,
most other countries view American class actions as a Pandora's box
that they want to avoid opening. Thus, a good deal of attention is
being devoted these days to studying and experimenting with proce-
dures for aggregation of cases that can avoid the perceived excesses of
the American experience.
II. AMERICAN CLASS ACTIONS
The American class action was the invention of equity, allowing cer-
tain groups of individuals with common interests to enforce their
rights in a single suit.8 When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
6. E.g., the Supreme Court of Indonesia and Indonesian Center for Environmental Law held
the International Conference on Class Action Procedures and Their Implementation in the In-
donesian Courts in Jakarta on February 18-20, 2002. On April 26, 2002, the Chief Justice of the
Indonesian Supreme Court issued Regulation Number I of 2002 Concerning Class Action Proce-
dures permitting "filling a claim in which one or more persons representing a class files a claim
having questions of fact or law in common among class representatives and class members con-
cerned. for himself/herself or themselves and at the same time representing a large group of
people." INDON. SUP. CT. REG. No. 1, art. 1 (2002). See also Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in
Brazil: A Model for Civil Law Countries. 51 AM. J. COMp. L. (forthcoming 2003) (account of
fifteen years of experience with a class action statute reflecting both civil law and American
influences): 3 COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE AFFAIRS OF THE MASTERBOUND GROUP AND
INVESTOR PROTECIION IN SouiH AFRICA 651-953 (recommending class actions).
7. One proposal suggests:
A major reason for the Australian reticence about class actions is the horror stories
from the United States. A Fortune Magazine headline says it all-Lawyers from hell:
slip up and guys like these will bankrupt your company. A picture is painted of aggres-
sive plaintiff lawyers conjuring massive class claims based on spurious product faults,
ruining a company financially with no social benefit. The lawyers are regarded as the
villains, often being the main financial beneficiaries of the litigation . . . . The poor
reputation of the US procedure has prompted many commentators in Australia to de-
liberately use the term "representative proceeding" rather than class action.
Proposal for a New Supreme Court Rule on Representative Proceedings in NSW to the Supreme
Court Rule Committee. 1998 CENTRE FOR LEGAL PROCESS OF THE NSW L. FOUND. & PUB. INT.
ADVoc. CENTRE 12.
8. See STEPHEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROW, LITIGATION To THE MODERN CLASS
ACrION (1987).
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were adopted in 1938, the equitable class action was extended to all
actions in federal courts under the merger of law and equity. The new
rules provided for three kinds of class actions, depending on the na-
ture of the rights asserted. Under all three categories, individuals had
to choose affirmatively to be a party (that is, opt in), and only parties
could share in any recovery. The first two categories-"true," 9 which
were limited to suits concerning "joint rights," and "hybrid,"' 0 which
were limited to suits concerning rights in a specific property-in-
volved a strong identity of interest between class members and thus,
were only available in a small number of cases. The third category-
the "spurious class action"-involved a weaker identity of interest, re-
quiring only that the class members shared a "common" question of
law or fact. This had the potential for use in many suits, but it was
treated with suspicion. Unlike the other two categories, spurious class
actions were not accorded a binding effect on class members, making
the possibility of settlement unattractive to defendants. It was used
primarily to avoid jurisdictional obstacles in accomplishing joinder
and was rarely resorted to. From 1938 until the class actions rules
were amended in 1966, class actions were few and far between.
A. Categories of Class Actions
The 1966 amendments to the class action rules occurred as the
United States went through its civil rights revolution and as a variety
of new causes of action were emerging from common law and consti-
tutional decisions of courts and statutory changes.I' The amendments
established three kinds of class actions, distinguished by functional
tests and not mutually exclusive.
9. A "true" class action, the most compelling category for group litigation, had to litigate the
"joint rights" of the class members. This was exemplified by the 1921 case Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), in which certain certificate holders of a fraternal organi-
zation were allowed to sue on behalf of all 70,000 certificate holders to overturn a reorganization
that reclassified their certificates and thus injured their joint property interests.
10. A "hybrid" class action was allowed when "several" rather than "joint" rights were as-
serted against a specific property, a fairly limited situation.
11. See Abram Chayes. The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation. 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (describing a new "public law model" of litigation in which "the object of
litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." seeking "complex forms of
ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the
judge's continued involvement in administration and implementation," as in "school desegrega-
tion, employment discrimination, and prisoners' or inmates rights cases").
[Vol. 52:401
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1. "Incompatible Standards" or "Impeding of Interests" Class
Actions
The first category presents particularly compelling situations for
class action treatment. A Rule 23(b)(1)(A), or "incompatible stan-
dards" class, is available if separate suits would risk inconsistent adju-
dications that would establish "incompatible standards" for the party
opposing the class.' 2 An example is when separate suits by quarrel-
ling beneficiaries of a trust might impose incompatible standards on
the trustee concerning distributions to the beneficiaries. A Rule
23(b)(1)(B), or "impeding of interests" class, is applicable if separate
suits would, as a practical matter, impede the ability of other persons
to protect their interests in a common property or right. 13 The classic
example is the "limited fund," where the claims of the class members
exceed the defendant's assets and separate suits could leave nothing
for other potential class members.' 4 Because these situations are so
limited, Rule 23(b)(1) accounts for only a tiny percentage of Ameri-
can class actions.
2. Injunctive Class Actions
A Rule 23(b)(2) class is available where injunctive or declaratory
relief is sought against a party who has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class. 15 The paradigm are the
"civil rights" suits of the 1960s and 1970s that brought an end to segre-
gation and enforced the new federal civil rights acts, and the "institu-
tional reform" suits of the 1970s and 1980s that enforced a wide range
of constitutional and statutory standards against institutions like pris-
ons and mental hospitals.
Resort to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions has decreased since the mid-
1980s as the Supreme Court and federal courts imposed stricter sub-
stantive standards and procedural limitations on constitutional and
public law reform causes of action. However, there has been some
increase in Rule 23(b)(2) class action filings in recent years as plain-
tiffs' lawyers have sought to avoid increasingly stringent limitations
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(B).
14. This category has resulted in few class actions, in part because the federal rule has been
read to exclude damage suits. See Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583 (S.D.
Ohio 1987) (holding the "'(b)(l)(B) class action is not available when there is only the possibility
of multiple damage suits, as opposed to injunctive or declaratory actions that would subject the
defendant to competing decrees as to future conduct"). A few intermediate state courts in Texas
have deviated from this interpretation. See Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.
App. 1994).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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placed by some courts on class action suits for money damages.
Money damages may be recovered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action only
if they are "incidental" to the injunctive relief,16 and some class ac-
tions have been structured to seek primarily injunctive relief for class
members, like "medical monitoring" for persons who were exposed to
hazardous substances or took allegedly dangerous medical drugs.1 7
Some federal courts have blunted these attempts by giving a restric-
tive reading to the "incidental to the injunctive relief" requirement in
Rule 23(b)(2), causing conflict among various courts, which has not
yet been resolved. 8
3. "Common Question" Class Actions
The third category is a catch-all to allow class treatment when close
identity of interest is not present but there is enough commonality
among persons similarly situated that class treatment would serve the
interests of fairness and efficiency. Unlike the other two categories, it
was contemplated that these would be suits for damages. A Rule
23(b)(3) class is available when a court finds that "questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is su-
perior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.' 19 Today, a very high percentage of
American class actions are Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. They have be-
come the vehicle for damage class action suits across a broad spectrum
of antitrust, civil rights, securities fraud, consumer, mass tort, environ-
mental, and product liability claims. Unlike the first two categories of
class actions, the members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class must be given "the
best notice practicable" that the class action is being proposed and a
right to "opt out" of the class if they choose. 20
16. The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 23 state that class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
17. An injunction requiring that defendant provide "medical monitoring" is appropriate when
plaintiffs were significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through defendant's negli-
gence and, as a proximate result, suffer significantly increased risk of contracting a serious dis-
ease that makes periodic examinations for early detection and treatment reasonably necessary.
Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Paolli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916
F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process and the Right
to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1051, 1073-80 (2002).
18. Compare Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998), with Robinson v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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In the first couple of decades after the 1966 amendments, the pre-
dominant class actions for monetary damages were cases brought
under federal antitrust, securities, and civil rights laws. These were
often national classes not presenting serious problems as to conflict of
laws, identity of interests, or determination of damages. 2' Since that
time, consumer class actions have blossomed against practices in such
industries as insurance, banking, credit cards, and telecommunica-
tions. Courts have differed markedly in their willingness to certify
such class actions. 22
The most contentious arena for class actions today involves tort law,
including mass accidents (like plane or railway crashes or collapse of a
building), environmental disasters (like the escape of toxic chemicals
into the air or water), and defective products (like asbestos, prescrip-
tion drugs, appliances, vehicles, or computer hardware/software). The
drafters' notes to the 1966 rule amendments stated that mass torts are
inappropriate for class certification, 23 but situations in which large
numbers of individuals are harmed by the same conduct, condition, or
product have led many courts to certify classes across the broad spec-
trum of tort law. 24 In the mid-1990s, a number of federal appellate
courts, increasingly followed by state courts, took a more critical view
21. National or multi-state class actions offer the advantage of economies of scale and avoid-
ance of inconsistent results from state to state. However, unless the cause of action is based on
federal law (as most mass-tort and consumer suits are not), differing state laws could make a
unitary trial impossible. The Sixth Circuit, in In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir.
1996), found that a judge would face an impossible task in instructing a jury on the relevant law
if more than a few laws of the states differ. The Fifth Circuit, in Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.. 84
F.3d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1996), noted that in a multi-state class action, variations in state law may
swamp any common issues and defeat predominance. However, a number of state and federal
courts have determined that the relevant laws do not differ among the states or that one state's
law can be applied under appropriate choice of law doctrines, and have certified national or
multi-state class actions.
22. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Action Practice in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1603,
1616-18 (2000).
23. Comments of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendments to Rule
23. 39 F.R.D. 69. 103 (1966) (warning that "a 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action," and "would degenerate in practice into
multiple lawsuits separately tried").
24. Professor Charles Alan Wright commented eighteen years after the 1966 amendments:
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when Rule 23
was amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee Note saying that mass torts
are inappropriate for class certification. I thought then that was true. I am profoundly
convinced now that that is untrue. Unless we can use the class action and devices built
on the class action, our judicial system is not going to be able to cope with the challenge
of the mass repetitive wrong.
Transcript of Oral Argument (July 30, 1984) at 106, In re Asbestos Sch. Litig.. 594 F. Supp. 178
(E.D. Pa. 1984), reprinted in 3 H. NEWBERG. NEWBERc ON CLASS AcTIONS § 17.06 (3d ed.
1992).
Similarly, Judge Jack Weinstein noted, regarding the Advisory Committee note:
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of class actions. In 1995, a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in rejecting
a class action on behalf of hemophiliacs who were infected with HIV
from tainted blood manufactured by the defendant companies, com-
mented on a "blackmail" impact that too loose class certification stan-
dards could have on defendants.25 Mass tort class actions continue to
be filed in large numbers 26 with courts differing markedly on whether
to certify an action as a class.
B. American Class Action Practice
In the thirty-five years since the 1966 amendments, class actions
have occupied an increasing share of American courts' attention.27
As authority for this warning against attempts to use class actions in torts, the note cites
an article [1] wrote as a law professor. As a judge [I have] been forced to ignore this
indiscretion when faced with the practicalities of mass tort litigation. In the earlier
1960's we did not fully understand the implications of mass tort demands on our legal
system.
Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effects of Equity on Mass Torts. 1991 U. ILL. L.
REV. 269, 288.
25. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
26. A principal lobbying organization for insurers cited congressional and committee testi-
mony that in 1998, "corporations are facing a 300% to 1.000% increase in class action lawsuits,"
and that "Ford Motor Company's general counsel observed that his company, which in the past
might have fought a half-dozen class action suits at a time, as of 1997 faced nearly 70 such
actions." ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS. CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: PROBLEMS AND SO-
LUTIONS 11 (2001).
27. For informative views of American class action practice, see Robert G. Bone, Rule 23
Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79 (1994): John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle
for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997): Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Be-
yond "It Just Ain't Worth It": Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Actions Reform. 64 LAW &
COMTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2001): Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman. The Inadequate Search for
"Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA. Inc.. 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998):
Richard L. Marcus. They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23. 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 858 (1995): Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges. 73 TEX. L. REV.
1821 (1995): Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionalit' of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action
Amendments. 39 ARiz. L. REV. 615 (1997): George L. Priest, Procedural versus Substantive Con-
trols of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521 (1997): William W. Schwarzer, Settle-
ment of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995); Roger H.
Trangsrud. Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent. 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69: Rhonda Wasser-
man. Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000): Mark C. Weber, A Content-Based Ap-
proach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1155 (1998). Symposia on class actions include Symposium, Lessons in State Class Actions,
Punitive Damages, and Jury Decisions Making. 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001) (articles by
Francis E. McGovern. Laura J. Hines, Richard A. Nagareda, Elizabeth J. Cabraser. Joan Stein-
man, and Theodore Eisenberg & Virginia A. Canipe): Symposium. Class Actions in the Gulf
South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (articles by Edward F. Sherman, Martin L.C. Feldman, Sa-
muel Issacharoff, Francis E. McGovern, Geoffrey P. Miller. Linda S. Mullenix, Richard A.
Nagareda, Charles Silver, Jack Ratliff. Richard P. Ieyoub, Theodore Eisenberg, William H.
Pryor, Jr.. and Edward Brunet): Symposium. The Institute of Judicial Administration Research
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They have spawned lucrative practices for a sophisticated group of
plaintiffs' firms and attracted the ire of defendant, insurance, and bus-
iness organizations. A number of proposals to alter the American
class action have been proposed over the years, either through stricter
requirements, limitations on judges' discretion, heightened proce-
dures, or removal to federal courts which are perceived to be less sym-
pathetic to class actions than state courts.28 The principal features of
American class action practice that are often singled out for criticism
are described below.
1. Self-Appointed Class Representatives
A class action is begun by a person (or persons) filing suit as class
representative for a defined class. The class representatives are self-
appointed, having talked with a lawyer and decided that they want to
sue on behalf of the class. This may be done for a variety of reasons.
The person suing may genuinely feel that the defendant whose con-
duct harmed him should also have to answer to other persons similarly
harmed. Or, on talking with a lawyer, he may have learned that his
possible recovery in an individual suit is too small to justify the ex-
pense of the litigation, and he can only get a lawyer to take the case if
the lawyer can obtain his fees and litigation expenses out of the bene-
fits to a class as a whole. Many class actions are primarily the creation
of a lawyer or law firm that recruit the representative plaintiffs and
finance the costs of the suit.2 9 Indeed, "entrepreneurial litigation," in
which the class attorneys are the primary interested parties in the suit,
is the subject of much debate in the American class action scene.30
Concern that attorneys are the prime force in creating a class ac-
tion, with the ability to select and manipulate the representative plain-
tiffs, led to statutory limitations on securities fraud class actions.
Securities fraud litigation was alleged to be abusive in having "straw
men" representative plaintiffs, and in 1995, Congress imposed a num-
ber of restrictions on eligibility to serve as a class representative. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act included a requirement that
the named plaintiffs did not purchase the security at the direction of
Conference on Class Actions. 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 1996 (articles by Samuel Estreicher. Edward
H. Cooper, Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
David Rosenberg. George Rutherglen, Judith Resnik. et al.. Nancy Morawetz. Brian Wolfman &
Alan B. Morrison. Geoffrey P. Miller, and Larry Kramer).
28. See HENSLER ET AL.. CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE
GAIN 15-37 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2000) [hereinafter Rand Report].
29. Id. at 402-07.
30. See John Coffee. Jr.. The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action. 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
counsel or to participate in a securities fraud suit, a preference for
shareholders with the largest financial interest to serve as lead repre-
sentative plaintiffs and a prohibition on plaintiffs receiving more than
their pro rata share of the recovery. 31
2. Notice and "Opt-Out" Provisions
Before certification of a suit as a class action, the members of the
class, in certain categories of class actions, must be given notice. Indi-
vidual notice is not mandated in Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions. However, in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the representative
plaintiff must give the putative class members "the best notice practi-
cable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort. ' 32 In many
consumer and product liability class actions where there are insuffi-
cient records of purchase, notice must be made through publication in
newspapers, periodicals, radio, television, or through posting in places
calculated to be seen by class members. Proposed amendments to the
federal class action rules attempt to make notice more meaningful to
potential class members. 33
The 1966 amendments abandoned the "opt-in" requirement of the
old rule. In a Rule 23(b)(3) suit for damages, the notice to the puta-
tive class members will tell them that they need not take any action if
they want to be a member of the class, and that unless they mail in an
"opt-out" form, they will be bound by the results of the litigation. If
one "opts out," she will be excluded as a member of the class and can
pursue the claim on her own if she wishes. In such case, she may hire
her own lawyer and file a separate suit. The percentage of "opt outs"
in most class actions is small, which could be explained by the fact that
many class members, particularly in consumer and product liability
cases, are content to have the case brought on their behalf, or simply
by the natural inclination of people toward inaction in such situations.
Insurance and business interests have signaled a major campaign to
31. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
See also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(1998) (limiting the conduct of securities class actions brought under state law).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
33. In August of 2001, the U.S. Judicial Conference published proposed changes for public
comment, including a new requirement for notice in all three categories of class actions at the
judge's discretion (the present rules only require it for Rule 23(b)(3) classes) and that all notices
be in "plain, easily understood language." The Federal Judicial Center is preparing forms of
notice in plain language. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. § 1715
(lst & 2d Sess. 2001). and Class Action Fairness Act of 2002. S. 1712. 107th Cong. § 1716 (1st &
2d Sess. 2002). would impose requirements in terms of language, format, and content for written,
television, or radio notices of proposed settlements.
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change the "opt-out" provisions in the class action rules to require an
affirmative act to "opt in."34
3. Attorney's Fees and Entrepreneurial Incentives
American class action practice is often driven by the financial incen-
tives for lawyers to take a case and, not infrequently, to finance the
litigation. After a successfully litigated class action, the judge will de-
termine the amount of attorney's fees to be paid out of the "common
fund" deemed to have been created for the benefit of the class.35 One
method for calculating attorney's fees in class actions is the "lodestar,"
with fees based on reasonable hours expended plus a possible "multi-
plier" to reflect such factors as the degree of risk and success in the
case. A second method increasingly being used is to allow recovery of
a "percentage of the fund" created for the class (a benchmark is ap-
proximately 25%, although the award may be adjusted higher or
lower depending on the specific facts of a case). 36 A high percentage
of certified class actions are settled with the parties agreeing on the
34. See Testimony of Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., on Behalf of Lawyers for Civil Justice, to the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Feb. 13, 2002):
Many significant problems of fundamental fairness, due process, justiciabilitiy, and the
right to trial by jury are created because the default mechanism under Rule 23(b)(3) is
opt-out rather than opt-in. The inertia is, in effect, shifted in favor of inclusion in the
class, the individual plaintiff's right to control the litigation is undermined, defendants
are precluded from raising individual defenses, and fundamental issues of liability, cau-
sation, injury, and damages disappear in the crush to get a result.
Id. at 3.
35. See Rand Report, supra note 28, at 77-79. When a class action is settled, the amount of
the class counsel's fee is often stated in the settlement, but it must be approved by the court after
a "fairness" hearing in which it assesses the overall terms of settlement.
36. An increasing number of federal courts are using the "percentage of the fund" method.
See, e.g., In re Thirteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Du Pont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.. 56
F.3d 295, 304-08 (1st Cir. 1995). A Task Force has described the lodestar method as a "cumber-
some, enervating and often surrealistic process of preparing and evaluating fee petitions that
now plagues the Bench and Bar." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit
Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 255 (1986). It said that the lodestar method consumed enormous
judicial resources by requiring courts to review attorney billing information, gave attorneys little
incentive to settle early, and "reward[ed] plodding mediocrity and penalize[d] expedient suc-
cess." Id. Judge Posner. writing in In re Continental Illinois Securities Litig., 962 F.2d 566. 568
(7th Cir. 1992), argued that "it is not the function of judges in fee litigation to determine the
equivalent of the medieval just price. It is to determine what the lawyer would receive if he were
selling his services in the market rather than being paid by court order." Courts using the per-
centage method have typically awarded fees in the 25-35% range. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION THIRD § 24.121, 187-91 (1995): In re Activision
Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that "absent extraordinary circum-
stances that suggest reasons to lower or increase the percentage, the rate should be set at 30%").
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amount of the class attorney's fees, subject to the approval of the
court. Attorney's fees can be very large.37
Class action practice is often criticized when the lawyers receive
fees in the millions of dollars while each class member receives a small
sum. However, the advisory committee that drafted the 1966 rules
noted that class actions provide means for vindicating the rights of
people who individually lack effective strength to bring their oppo-
nents into court. Thus, the "superiority" of a Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tion 38 may be based on the fact that there is little incentive for class
members to sue individually for small sums (for example, overcharges
on utility bills averaging fifty dollars per customer). Class action crit-
ics argue that in such "negative value" cases, only the lawyers bene-
fit. 39 The supporters' response is that such class actions are needed
for both deterrence and disgorgement of wrongful profits: if class ac-
tions on behalf of persons who are only entitled to receive small sums
were not allowed, there would be little incentive to sue wrongdoers
who overcharge or injure a large number of people only in small
amounts.
4. Prerequisites for Class Treatment
After holding a hearing, a court will rule on whether a suit can be
certified as a class action. The following four prerequisites must be
satisfied: numerosity (that the class is so numerous that joinder of all
class members is impracticable); 40 commonality (a common question
of law or fact); typicality (the claims of the class representative have
the same general characteristics as those of the class); and representa-
tiveness (the representative is dedicated to pursuing the litigation in
the interests of the class, class counsel is competent and financially
able to conduct the litigation, and there are no antagonisms between
37. See, e.g., In re Combustion, 968 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. La. 1997) (36% of $127 million): In re
Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. 11), 186 F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (25% of $190 million). See
also Rand Report. supra note 28, at 434-37. 490-93 (comparing attorney's fees versus recovery by
individual plaintiffs).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (a class action must be "superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
39. The 1997 Proposed Amendments of the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on the
Civil Rules, which were not adopted, would have changed Rule 23(b)(3) to require consideration
of whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and burdens of class
litigation.
40. A rule of thumb is about twenty-five, although varying according to the circumstances.
See Swanson v. Am. Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326. 1330, n.3 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding
joinder of forty impracticable): Ark. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 446 F.2d 763. 765 (8th Cir.
1971) (finding class of seventeen black teachers was sufficiently numerous because of their "nat-
ural fear or reluctance" to bring separate actions): Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co.. 49 F.R.D. 17
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (holding joinder of 350 public entities was not impracticable).
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the interests of the representative and the class members). 41 Addi-
tionally, in recent years, class definitions have been particularly scruti-
nized with insistence that the class be clearly ascertainable by
reference to objective criteria. 42 This reflects the growing desire of
American courts to corral expansive class actions by imposing the
strict threshold requirement of an adequate class definition.
The commonality requirement tends to dominate defendants' chal-
lenges to class action suits. In Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions, the commonality threshold is low, requiring only one or more
common issues of law or fact. The very nature of those forms of class
actions-where "incompatible standards" or "impeding of interests"
would result from separate suits, or where injunctive or declaratory
relief is sought 43-suggests a high degree of identity of interest. How-
ever, Rule 23(b)(3) class actions lack such an obvious identity of inter-
est, and the battleground in these suits is how to apply the additional
requirement that "questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over questions affecting only individual mem-
bers."' 44 American courts devote a great deal of attention to whether
there is sufficient identity of interest or cohesiveness among the class
members, particularly when separate transactions, acts, or omissions
are involved. 45
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
42. See Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2000) (holding a definition based on
what class members alleged would require court "to inquire individually into each proposed class
member's state of mind to ascertain class membership"): Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d
398 (Tex. 2000) (stating that "[wlhen the class definition is framed as a legal conclusion, the trial
court has no way of ascertaining whether a given person is a member of the class until a determi-
nation of ultimate liability as to that person is made").
43. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
44. See supra text accompanying note 19.
45. In consumer cases involving individual transactions, some courts have been willing to find
predominance of common questions based on a common course of fraudulent conduct. See Ad-
ams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App. 1990) ("[W]here the defendant is alleged to have
engaged in a common course of conduct, the commonality requirement is met and class certifica-
tion is appropriate . . . . Fraud perpetrated on numerous persons through the use of similar
misrepresentations may be suitable for class action."). But see Wallace v. Smith Barney, 1997
WL 137412 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997) (unpublished opinion) (holding allegations that plain-
tiffs were induced to invest by similar misrepresentations and omissions failed to establish pre-
dominance because substantial questions to determine each member's right to recover
remained). Environmental cases often involve separate circumstances of exposure, creating pre-
dominance problems. Compare Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)
(certifying class of persons within discrete area whose water was contaminated by leakage from
defendant's chemical waste burial site), with Blake v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp., No. 86-3413, 1988
WL 6151 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1988) (refusing to certify class of persons exposed to pesticides ap-
plied by defendants to lawns, citing different incidents in time, place, and conditions). Likewise,
product or medicine cases often involve separate transactions relating to circumstances of
purchase or possession, use, causation, and injuries. Compare In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069
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The test for predominance of common issues is whether common
issues will be the focus of most of the efforts of the litigants.46 Its
purpose is to determine whether a unitary class trial can be conducted
with primarily class-wide (as opposed to individualized) evidence and
not break down into multiple trials of issues and facts relevant to only
individual class members. Even if there are many common issues,
class treatment will not lead to the efficient termination of the litiga-
tion if significant issues must still be resolved individually.4 7 Issues
that may require individualized evidence include proof of "reliance"
in consumer cases involving fraud or misrepresentation and proof of
"causation" in environmental and product liability cases. Courts have
differed markedly in their willingness to certify such class actions. 48
5. Damages
Determining damages in a class action may require individualized
evidence, such as proving each class member's personal injuries in a
tort case or expectation damages in a contract case. On the other
hand, damages may sometimes be susceptible to generalized proof ap-
plicable to the entire class through such methods, necessarily sup-
ported by expert testimony, as models, formulas, extrapolation, and
(6th Cir. 1996) (refusing to certify where class members used different models under different
circumstances), with In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (certi-
fying class of users of nearly identical pacemakers manufactured by one company).
46. Life Ins. Co. of Southwest v. Brister, 722 S.W.2d 764, 772 (Tex. App. 1986). "The test for
predominance is not whether common issues outnumber uncommon issues but . . . 'whether
common or individual issues will be the object of most of the efforts of the litigants and the
court."' Southwest Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 434 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. City of San Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602. 610 (Tex. App. 1998)).
47. Castano, 84 F.3d at 745.
48. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Strombe. 2002 WL 31426407, at *7 (Tex. 2002) (in consumer
case, reliance is an element of proof for common-law fraud, as well as "claims of breach of
express warranty (to a certain extent), negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and
[Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations]"). See also In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069. Class
certification was sought for a nationwide class of persons who suffered damages from implants of
allegedly defective penile prosthesis manufactured by the defendant. The complaint sounded in
strict product liability, negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and fraud. The
circuit court found that individualized issues would predominate, making a class action unman-
ageable, noting that class members had used at least ten different models of the prosthesis and
that the legal claims would "differ depending upon the model and the year it was issued." Id. at
1081. It said:
In complex, mass, toxic tort accidents, where no one set of operative facts establishes
liability, no single proximate cause applied to each potential class member and each
defendant, and individual issues outnumber common issues, the district court should
properly question the appropriateness of a class action for resolving the controversy.
Id. at 1084. ,However. many product liability cases have been certified as classes, including such
products as automobiles, computer hardware and software, and pharmaceutical products.
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standard price manuals. 49 Even if proof of damages may require indi-
vidualized evidence, a class action is not necessarily foreclosed. Some
courts have certified classes to determine liability in a common trial
and have severed out damages to be determined later through such
methods as individual or small-group trials or some form of adminis-
trative determination. 50  Courts differ, however, on their willingness
to find that such methods comport with standards of efficiency and
fairness.
Some courts have also approved dividing up liability issues to be
tried in separate phases. For example, in 1986, a federal appellate
court in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 5I approved the certifica-
tion of a class action for persons exposed to asbestos. The trial court
ordered a class-wide trial of common issues relating to the defendant
manufacturer's conduct, but left for later "phased trials" such individ-
ualized issues as the exposure of each class member, affirmative de-
fenses like statute of limitations, and damages. 52 This has been
referred to as bifurcation, trifurcation, or polyfurcation. 53 In cases
where causation through exposure to defendant's product is a central
disputed issue (such as asbestos cases), courts have even approved
49. See Southwest Ref. Co., 22 S.W.3d at 437, stating:
With the help of models, formulas, extrapolation, and damage brochures, plaintiffs may
indeed be able to present their case in an expeditious manner. Likewise. [defendant]
may choose to present a timely and efficient defense, making arguments presenting
evidence on only a generalized, class-wide basis. But, while [defendant] may not be
entitled to separate trials, it is entitled to challenge the credibility of and its responsibil-
ity for each personal injury claim individually.
Id.
50. See discussion of "Bifurcation and Trifurcation" in RICHARD L. MARCUS & El)WARD F.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE
836-50 (3d ed. 1998).
51. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
52. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.. Inc.. 782 F.2d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1986). See also In re Shell
Oil Refinery. 136 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. La. 1991), aff d sub nom. Watson v. Shell Oil Co.. 979 F.2d
1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992) (failing to reach challenges to a four-phase trial where details had not
yet been determined by trial court, but upholding a phase two determination of punitive dam-
ages by trying claims of eleven class members together with evidence about the claims of thirty
illustrative plaintiffs and expert testimony about damages to the entire class). "Hybrid" class
actions, in which some claims are certified for class treatment and others are severed for later
individual treatment, have been approved by some courts. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray.
79 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002) (certifying only claim for breach of warranty based
on defective disc drives).
53. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 29 (6th Cir. 1988) (approving trifurcation of
causation, liability, and damages for consolidation of eight hundred cases seeking damages for
allegedly defective anti-nausea drug): Symbolic Control, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 643 F.2d
1339 (9th Cir. 1980) (approving bifurcation of antitrust suit in appropriate circumstances but
rejecting a phase one trial of causation where violation was improperly assumed).
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"reverse bifurcation" by which the issue of generic causation 54 is de-
termined in the first phase, and liability is addressed in the second
phase. 55 This ordering is based on the belief that once there has been
a determination that the defendant's product could cause the injury
(for example, exposure to asbestos could be the cause of asbestosis or
smoking could be the cause of lung cancer), the parties are more likely
to settle without the need for a full trial. However, when different
juries will be used for different phases, some courts have found a vio-
lation of the defendant's right to trial by jury under the Seventh
Amendment. 56
One federal district court relied on random sampling and
probability analysis in an attempt to avoid the necessity for individual
trials in later phases of an asbestos class action.57 The court ordered
that issues susceptible of common proof be tried first and that dam-
ages be determined in individual trials of 160 plaintiffs randomly se-
lected from the five asbestos disease categories. The average damage
award for each category was extrapolated to all class members in that
category.58  The federal appellate court found the "extrapolation"
phase improper, holding that it violated the defendants' Seventh
Amendment right to individualized evidence as to causation and dam-
54. The question of "generic causation" is whether the product is capable of causing the dis-
ease or injuries alleged, while "individual causation" is still required to show that an individual
plaintiff was actually exposed to the product that caused his injuries.
55. See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 473 n.8 (stating that "Jr]everse bifurcation' ... is a modified
bifurcated trial format whereby plaintiffs in the first trial prove only that exposure to some as-
bestos product has caused their damages. Thereafter, either the cases are settled or remaining
issues are resolved in second or third trials.").
56. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 337.
A second jury, or a number of "second" juries, will pass on the individual issues [such
as proximate causation, comparative negligence, reliance, and compensatory damages.
to be tried in the second phase], either on a case-by-case basis or through group trials of
individual plaintiffs. The Seventh Amendment entitles parties to have fact issues de-
cided by one jury, and prohibits a second jury from reexamining those facts and issues.
Thus, the Constitution allows bifurcation of issues that are so separate that the second
jury will not be called upon to reconsider findings of fact by the first.
Id. (citing Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978)). See In re Rhone-
Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303.
[M]ost of the separate "cases" that compose this class action will be tried, after the
initial trial in the Northern District of Illinois, in different courts, scattered throughout
the country. The right to a jury trial in federal civil cases, conferred by the Seventh
Amendment, is a right to have juriable issues determined by the first jury impaneled to
hear them (provided there are no errors warranting a new trial), and not reexamined by
another finder of fact.
[d.
57. Cimino v. Raymark Indus.. Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990). rev'd, 151 F.3d 297 (5th
Cir. 1998).
58. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653.
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age issues for each class member. 59 It is possible that some state
courts will still take a different approach, but it appears that the crea-
tive use of probability analysis to avoid determining damages in indi-
vidual trials received a fatal blow.
If a class action goes to a trial and judgment is awarded, the court
may establish a claims process for paying the awards to the class mem-
bers. Class members would receive notice that they must return a
claim form to prove that they were injured by the defendant's conduct
or product; for example, proof that they paid overcharges on utility
bills or purchased and used defendant's product.60 Most class actions
are settled, and settlement agreements typically establish procedures
for paying the class members, often through a claims process.
6. Settlement Practices
The class action rule requires judges to approve all settlements after
a fairness hearing. However, it may be difficult for a court to get an
accurate picture of the strengths and weaknesses of a case when the
parties have signed on to a settlement. Although defendants may ini-
tially oppose class certification, they may be willing to settle upon the
certification of an extremely broad class that will preclude all litiga-
tion by class members in the future. In the 1997 case Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor,6t the Supreme Court vacated a class settlement
that included hundreds of thousands of persons who had been ex-
posed to the defendant's asbestos products, but had not manifested
harmful effects. It found that such "future claims" class actions failed
to satisfy the Rule 23 class action requirements.
Two years later in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,62 the Court rejected a
global settlement of an asbestos class action brought as a mandatory
"limited fund" class, finding improper the unequal distribution of
funds to different class members. Similarly, "coupon" settlements, in
which the class members receive a coupon for a discount in purchasing
another of the defendant's products while the class attorneys receive
large cash attorney's fees, have been rejected by many courts.63 Pro-
posed rule changes and legislation would impose strict standards for
approving class action settlements. The rule amendments proposed in
59. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 321.
60. See Rand Report, supra note 28, at 454-59. A claims process. however. cannot necessarily
substitute for a jury finding of causation and injury to each class member. See Becton Dickinson
& Co. v. Usrey, 57 S.W.2d 488, 495-96 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001).
61. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
62. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
63. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloved, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996): In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig.. 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
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2001 would require a judge to find that a settlement is "fair, reasona-
ble, and adequate" and would allow Rule 23(b)(3) class members to
"opt out" of a settlement, even if they had not previously opted out at
the time of class certification. 64
III. EUROPEAN UNION GROUP LITIGATION
In 1998, the European Parliament and Council issued the "Euro-
pean Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Inter-
ests," which had to be implemented into national law by the end of
2000. The directive provided that rights of action would be assigned
to "qualified entities" that are either organizations (such as consumer
associations) or independent public bodies (such as administrative
agencies). Such entities would be allowed to file "group litigation" on
behalf of a specifically defined group of people adversely affected by a
defendant's conduct.
The title of the directive is something of a misnomer, as an injunc-
tion, as well as damages, may be sought in some countries in certain
situations. The term "consumers' interests" is broadly interpreted,
comprehending suits to vindicate rights under consumer protection,
competition, and fair contract practices. However, European "group
representation" is much more limited than the American class action,
requiring advance determination of the right to serve as a representa-
tive rather than allowing the American "self-selective" approach.
The European group representation model differs dramatically
from the American model in its conception of who should be empow-
ered to sue on behalf of others and what degree of cohesiveness is
required to qualify as a group for purposes of representation. Profes-
sor Harald Koch65 has described the philosophy behind the EU
approach:
There is no method of self-appointment of an individual cham-
pion (plaintiff) and no concept of an individual private Attorney
General, whose initiative is fostered by fee incentives or by an allur-
ing contingency fee arrangement. To be sure, this may be well de-
served because of the risk assumed and the attorney's hard work;
however, in the European tradition-although this may be slightly
over-simplified-we entrust the public interest to public institutions
rather than to private law enforcers. By doing so, we must put up
with all of the problems of a poorly-motivated, cumbersome, and
perhaps understaffed bureaucracy, as well as the question of legiti-
macy of representation. Under such a system, the interests of indi-
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (Proposed Amendment 2001).
65. Professor of Law. Law Faculty, Rostock University. Germany.
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vidual victims of unlawful behavior tend to be neglected in larger
and more autonomous organizations. 66
1. Germany
The European directive is being implemented in a variety of ways
by EU countries. In Germany, it has been incorporated into the Stan-
dard Contract Terms Act and the Unfair Competition Act, providing
for a right of action for consumer associations (Verbandsklage). 67
Those eligible must be placed on a list drawn up by the Federal Ad-
ministrative Office and communicated to the EC-Commission. There
has been talk of enacting a comprehensive law on collective remedies,
but that has not happened, and group representation remains limited
essentially to the consumer area. 68 It is also limited to injunctive relief
consistent with the civil law perception that the function of damages is
to compensate the individual victim while "the public interest prima-
rily stands for regulation and control and thus focuses on the violator
and effective sanctions. ' 69 The unavailability of damages considera-
bly reduces incentives for American-style entrepreneurial litigation.
In France and Greece, however, association's suits can be brought for
damages under certain circumstances. 70
The types of private groups or organizations that are empowered to
sue vary from country to country. In Germany, consumer organiza-
tions are the principal recipients of the right of action. In other coun-
tries, it can be assigned to organizations such as business federations,
unions, environmental associations, and chambers of commerce.
"This type of collective action is used for the control and enforcement
of competition and business standards, industrial property rules, envi-
ronmental law, etc."' 71 Governmental agencies can be assigned the
right to sue in many countries.
66. Harold Koch. Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INI'L L. 355, 357-68 (2001).
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 360.
70. The French notion of damages is more in the nature of "a nominal, or a non-material.
lump-sum" having a symbolic meaning (apparently like "nominal damages" in an American def-
amation suit). Id. "Recently, however, the awards in "actions civiles" brought by associations
have become increasingly larger and sometimes take the character of deterrent or punitive dam-
ages." Id. In Greece. the association may sue for "intangible losses that are usually awarded in a
lump-sum and must be used only for charitable purposes." Koch. supra note 66. at 361.
71. Id. at 360.
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2. Sweden
In May 2002, the Swedish Parliament passed the Act on Group Ac-
tions which provides for three forms of group action. 72 First, "organi-
zational" actions can be brought by affiliations of consumers or wage-
earners against businesses or by non-profit environmental organiza-
tions or professional federations in the fishing, farming, or forestry
industries seeking injunctions or compensation for environmental im-
pairment.73 A second form of group action can be brought by an au-
thority stipulated by the government. A third form, an "individual"
group action, can be brought by a person who is a member of a group.
This is the closest to the American class action. When a member ap-
plies to the court to proceed with a group action, those who fit the
plaintiff's description of the group are given notice and an opportunity
to "opt in." Those who do not "opt in" will not be bound by a deci-
sion in the case. Prerequisites for group status sound very much like
the American class action rule: the group must be adequately defined;
the suit must be based on one or more facts or questions of law that
are common to the group members; the representative must be suita-
ble to represent the group; the case must be dealt with effectively and
purposefully; and group litigation must be the best available procedu-
ral alternative.74 The representative is empowered to make a settle-
ment on behalf of the group if it is approved by the court.
The Swedish rule has been said to have more in common with Ca-
nadian class actions, which are "bound neither to the American no-fee
rule and contingency fees, nor to an extreme tort law and discovery,
with ambulance chasers and extremely powerful judges."'75 Since
Sweden follows the "loser pays" rule, the representative bears the risk
of having to pay the opponent's costs if the group loses. Group mem-
bers, on the other hand, will not be taxed with such costs unless they
intervene to become a party. An interesting feature is that a group
representative and an attorney can make a "risk-agreement" by which
the attorney's fees are contingent on finding liability, but unlike
American practice, the fee will be based on an hourly rate.
The European assignment to organizations of rights to pursue
group litigation removes the complaint of inadequate cohesiveness
often made concerning American class action practice that allows any-
72. Henrik Lindbolm & Roberth Nordh, Scandinavian Developments: The New Swedish Act
on Group Actions 2 (paper delivered at the Toronto Symposium on Class Actions. Sept. 13-14,
2002). Similar proposals are being discussed in Norway and Finland. Id.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 1.
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one to become a representative plaintiff if he has a claim typical of
that of other class members. The European limitation of group litiga-
tion to organizations, however, restricts individuals' access to courts
for "negative value" class actions. It also stymies the entrepreneurial
incentives that have encouraged American lawyers to undertake the
costs and risks of taking on huge and powerful industries, like insur-
ance and tobacco.
Aspects of attorney's fees and costs particularly differentiate the
EU model from the American. First, in the EU class action context,
there is no tradition of attorneys taking and financing group cases in
anticipation of sizable fees. Indeed, attorney's fees are generally regu-
lated, and contingency fees are not allowed. 76 Furthermore, EU coun-
tries follow the "loser pays" rule requiring the losing side to pay the
other side's attorney's fees, in contrast to the "American rule" by
which the parties pay their own attorney's fees. 77 The risk that group
litigation plaintiffs will have to pay their opponent's attorney's fees if
they lose clearly provides a disincentive to group litigation. Professor
Koch comments:
Collective and public interest litigation needs some kind of dis-
charge of the plaintiff's risk, as the individual plaintiff obviously
does not litigate for his own economic advantage. The respective
cost rules for most European countries can be arranged in two cate-
gories. The first is public funding of the associations and their law-
yers and/or no fees for public interest litigation. The second is
financing "via the market" or abiding by the European rule of costs
(the loser pays principle).
However, following this market rule, even in public interest litiga-
tion by associations, there could be a major obstacle to the efficient
use of procedural remedies. In particular, if courts' expenses and
attorneys' fees are calculated by a percentage of the amount in con-
troversy (which is the rule in Germany), the risk involved in losing a
case of great public importance and then having to pay all the costs
(including the opposing attorneys' fees) would severely reduce
these semi-public and necessary control activities. Therefore, in
76. As with class actions, there is a great deal of interest abroad, although coupled with appre-
hension, in the American practice of contingent fees. Scotland has long allowed contingent fees
in limited situations, and England has recently moved towards limited contingent fees. Conti-
nental countries are still resistant, but interested. Canada and Australia allow a broader contin-
gent fee practice. The -loser pays" rule. however. may still impose considerable restraint on
resort to contingent fees.
77. See Edward F. Sherman. From "Loser Pays- to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Recon-
ciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice. 76 TEX. L. REv. 1863 (1998).
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light of the law enforcement functions served by the associations'
suits, they should at least be co-financed by public subsidies. 78
3. United Kingdom
The manner in which the United Kingdom carries out the European
Union directive will be interesting. An English procedure for "repre-
sentative proceedings" has been available for over two hundred years
at common law, although it was used infrequently because of narrow
court interpretations. It permitted a person to take legal action on
behalf of persons who had "common issues" arising from "the same
interest" in a claim against the same defendant. It was given a defini-
tive interpretation in the House of Lords decision Duke of Bedford v.
Ellis79 in 1901. In that case, a group of market stallholders were al-
lowed to pursue a class action to assert a statutory right in relation to
allocation of certain stalls in Covent Garden. Lord MacNaughten said
that the requirement of "the same interest" is satisfied if the represen-
tative can show a common interest or common grievance and that the
relief sought is beneficial to all.8 0 However, in a series of later cases,
the requirement of common interest was used to give the rule a more
restrictive application. In Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co.
Ltd.,81 a member of the majority in the English Court of Appeals
stated that the requirement for a "common interest" meant there
must be issues common to all group members and the relief sought
must be the same.8 2 Representative proceedings were therefore not
available where the sole relief sought involved damages that would
have to be proved individually.8 3
In recent years, there has been a modest reshaping of the restrictive
interpretations and increased interest in invoking representative pro-
ceedings. The practical significance of the unavailability of the proce-
dure where damages are sought has been diminished by the use of
declaratory or injunctive relief.8 4 In EMI Records v. Riley,8 5 damages
were allowed to be claimed on the basis that it was procedurally sim-
pler and more convenient to determine a global figure for the class
78. Koch, supra note 66, at 365-66. See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Presssure on
Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. (forthcoming
Spring 2003).
79. 1 A.C. 1 (1901).
80. Id. (per Lord MacNaughten).
81. 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A. 1910).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. An example is Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Indus., 1 Ch. 229, 251 (1981).
85. 2 All E.R. 838 (Ch. 1981).
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affected by a breach of copyright.86 By 1989, it was accepted that
claims for damages were not automatically excluded from the opera-
tion of the rule merely because they were made severally by numerous
plaintiffs. 87
Like American class actions, representative proceedings can begin
without the court's permission, and the representative does not need
to be appointed or elected by the group.88 Curiously, there seems to
be less court supervision than in the United States; the court does not
monitor nor normally need to approve settlements. 89 Limitations on
damages, however, have been said to be "the reason why the English
representative action remains a procedural backwater rather than a
flourishing style of multi-party litigation." 90  Damages cannot be
awarded without reference to the particular loss suffered by members
of the class, and "the arithmetic of individual loss must be totted and
tabulated painfully and precisely." 91 The court can award damages in
a representative action only where: (i) the class members' loss can be
readily ascertained at the time of judgment; or (ii) the class members
have waived their rights to individual receipt of damages and instead
wish their compensation to be paid to a body enjoying care of their
interests. ' '92
Given the shortcomings of English representative actions, amend-
ments to the Civil Procedure Rules were made in 2000 to allow courts
to issue Group Litigation Orders providing for "the case management
of claims which give rise to related issues of fact or law." This is es-
sentially a consolidation device that has elements of the American
transfer of federal court cases with common questions to a single court
by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. 93 A court may deline-
ate a cluster of claims as appropriate for a Group Litigation Order.
The court to which the cases are assigned is the "management court,"
although different judges can be responsible for managing various fac-
ets of the litigation. The solicitors are expected to form a Solicitors'
Group. Parties who want to join the group litigation must "opt in," in
86. Id.
87. The fact that claims arise under separate contracts was found to be no bar to the use of a
representative action in Irish Shipping Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance. 2 Q.B. 206 (C.A.
1991). In 2002, a UK group litigation order was issued for "economy class syndrome- cases.
Class Action Litigation Reporter (BNA). Mar. 15. 2002.
88. Neil Andrews (Barrister), Multi-Partv Proceedings in England: Representative and Group
Actions. 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 249 (2001).
89. Id. at 252.
90. Id. at 253.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 262.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
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contrast to representative proceedings that "can effectively take place
behind the backs of class members without their knowledge, participa-
tion or control." 94 A group member is liable, if the group loses, to pay
"an equal proportion, together with all the other litigants, of the com-
mon costs," as well as "the amount of individual costs incurred by the
defendant in meeting that particular litigant's claim."'95
Representative proceedings and group litigation orders continue to
develop in the United Kingdom, but are still a far cry from American
class actions. 96 In addition, limitations on contingent fees and the
"loser pays" rule considerably curtail the entrepreneurial aspects of
American practice. Lord Steyn, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, ex-
plained at a conference that English senior judges "are opposed to a
'litigious society,' that is, an over-excited tendency for citizens and
businessmen to 'blame and claim' by bringing actions in the ordinary
courts rather than pursuing grievance procedures through political
systems of democratic accountability, pressure groups, ombudsmen,
arbitration, conciliation, etc."' 97 Nevertheless, growing EU interest in
group litigation, the influence of huge British solicitor firms capable of
undertaking class actions, and internal pressure in the United King-
dom for more fluid forms of legal practice (as seen in proposals to
allow limited contingent fees and to give solicitors greater rights of
audience at court) seem to militate in favor of an expansion of UK
representative or group procedures.
IV. AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS
All Australian jurisdictions have some form of "representative pro-
ceedings" contained in court rules that briefly restate the English
common law practice. 98 In the last few decades, rules and court prac-
tice in the Australian Federal Court and the courts of a number of
94. Andrews. supra note 88. at 260.
95. Id. at 262.
96. For recent accounts of UK practice. see C.J.S. HODGES. MUL-I-PARTY AC-FIONS (2000):
Mark Mildred. Cost-sharing in Group Litigation: Preserving Access to Justice. 65 MOD. L. REV.
597 (2002).
97. See Andrews. supra note 88, at 266.
98. Sup. CT. R. 019 r10 (ACT): Sup. CT. R. r18.02 (NT): Sup. CT. R. Pt8 r13 (NSW): Sup. CT.
R. 018 r12 (WA); Sup. Ci. R. 3 ri0 (Qld): Sup. CT. R. 018 r9 (Tas). The New South Wales,
Western Australia. and Queensland rules are identical, while the Australian Capital Territory
and Northern Territory rules are more abbreviated, but in similar terms. The Tasmanian rule is
much more restrictive-requiring seven or more persons. a "same or common right" against the
same person, and a "same or common interest." in relation to a common fund or property.
Constitutional challenges to various aspects of respresentative proceedings have been unsuccess-
ful. See Mobil Oil Austl. Pty Ltd v. Victoria (2002) H.C.A. 27 (upholding the Victoria represen-
tative proceedings law): Femcare Ltd v. Bright (2000) 100 F.C.R. 331 (upholding the validity of
Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act. 1976 (Cth)).
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Australian states have been more closely patterned on the American
class action model.
Until recently, the effect of narrow interpretations of the represen-
tative proceedings rule in England was to preclude representative ac-
tions where separate transactions were involved and damages claimed.
In 1986, an additional restriction was imposed by the Victorian Su-
preme Court, precluding representative actions where the claims in-
volved separate contracts. 99  Given these restrictions, few
representative proceedings were filed.100
The Australian High Court reversed that position in its 1995 deci-
sion Carnie v. Esanda,'0 1 supporting a broad interpretation of the
state of New South Wales's rule allowing representative proceedings.
The Carnies, wheat farmers, brought proceedings on behalf of them-
selves and eighty-eight other persons who had taken out loans with
the defendant. They challenged defendant's method of calculating in-
terest as invalid under the state's credit act. The High Court decision
made it clear that representative actions can proceed under the rule
even where there are separate contracts with the defendant: "It has
now been recognized that persons having separate causes of action in
contract or tort may have the same interest in the proceedings to en-
force those causes of action."' 1 2 The High Court also indicated that
class actions can be commenced where the case includes a claim for
damages, as precluding damages would be inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the rule.
The Federal Court of Australia has especially fostered the expan-
sion of representative practice. The provisions for representative pro-
ceedings in the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 were amended
in 1992 to set out comprehensive procedures.10 3 "The Federal Court
99. In 1981 the High Court of Australia held, in a case involving a joinder application (not a
class action). that separate contracts held by a number of abattoir owners were not a "series of
transactions." Payne v. Young (1981) 145 C.L.R. 609. The Victorian Supreme Court relied on
this decision when it ruled that a group of borrowers could not proceed with a representative
action against a finance company because there were separate contracts. Marino v. Esanda LTD
[19861 V.R. 735.
100. For a discussion of the history of class actions in Australia, see PUBLIC INTEREST ADvo-
CACY CENTER (PIAC) FOR THE COALITION FOR CLASS ACTIONS. PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCE[)
REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1991): PIAC & COALITION FOR CLASS ACTIONS, REPRESEN
TATIVE PROCEEDINGS (Supp. Aug. 1997) [hereinafter REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS]. CENTER
FOR LEGAL PROCESS OF THE NSW LAWS FOUNDATION & PIAC. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SU-
PREME COURT RULE ON REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS IN NSW ""o THE SUPREME COURT
RULE COMMITTEE (Mar. 1998).
101. Carnie v. Esanda Fin. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398.
102. Id. at 404. per Mason C.J.. Deane and Dawson, J.J. Similar comments were made by
Brennan. J. at 407-08, Toohev and Gaudron J. at 417-21. and McHugh J. at 43(0.
103. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976. Part IVA. § 43(IA) (Austl.).
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procedure has proven to be useful for a range of interests-consum-
ers, small businesses, and immigration applicants. An explosion of
class action litigation, repeatedly predicted ever since the procedures
were introduced, has not occurred." 10 4 Its use in product liability
cases has also been significant. 105 A survey by a law firm engaged in
representative proceedings found that approximately ninety actions
have been commenced in the federal court under the rule. 106
The federal rule requires that seven or more persons have a claim
against the same person and that the claims "arise out of the same,
similar or related circumstances," and "give rise to a substantial com-
mon issue of law or fact."'1 7 It applies even if individual damages are
claimed and if the proceedings involve separate transactions, acts, or
omissions.'08 Interestingly, the Australian federal rule does not follow
the American rule of requiring "predominance" of common ques-
tions. 10 9 The requirements for "same, similar, or related circum-
stances" and a "substantial common issue"' 1 0 seem to have been
adequate to determine whether there is sufficient cohesiveness for
representative proceedings. One justice expressed the view that a pre-
dominance test would "encourage respondents to raise artificial non-
common issues," while the focus should be on whether non-common
issues would be likely to swamp the common issues."'
It is not necessary for a judge to certify a class in Australia. "An
action that is commenced as a class action goes forward on this basis
unless a judge orders otherwise."' 12 The Australian rules do not set
out precise categories for class treatment. "Class actions may be
brought in respect of any type of claim and regardless of the type of
order sought from the court."113 Unlike the American rule that pro-
104. REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 100, at 5.
105. "Class actions are increasingly important given the trend to mass production of goods
and services; when a faulty product or service is released onto the market the impact might be
felt by hundreds of people." Id.
106. See Peter Cashman (of the law firm Maurice Blackburn Cashman, in Sydney, Australia),
Class Actions from the Plaintiff's Perspective (paper presented to the Annual Conference of the
Australian Insurance Law Association, Sydney, Apr. 5-7, 2000).
107. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33(c)(1) (Austl.).
108. Id. § 33(c)(2).
109. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires that "the questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(6)(3). See supra text accompanying note 19.
110. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, Part IVA. § 33C(l) (Austl.).
111. Justice M. Wilcox, Representative Proceedings in the Federal Court, A Progress Report
(1996-97), 15 AUSTL. B. REV. 91, 93-94 (1997).
112. Justice Murray Wilcox, Address at the Indonesian Legal Reform Program: International
Seminar on Class Actions 3 (Feb. 18-20, 2002).
113. Id. at 1.
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vides for a separate category for injunctive actions, "there is only a
need to use the class action procedure in a case where it is intended to
ask the court to make orders in favour of particular individuals, for
example, damage payments."'' 14 Australian courts have not drawn as
fine lines as have the American courts concerning when individual
damages will defeat class treatment."t5 "As damages claims are al-
ways personal to the individual claimant, damages claims can never be
identical.""l 6 Several large class actions have used American-style ag-
gregate methods for determining damages and claims processes al-
though these have generally been pursuant to settlement. Something
akin to American "phased" or "bifurcated" trials has been accepted,
without the American anguish over when they can be used (perhaps in
part because there is no right to trial by jury).'1 7 Justice Murray Wil-
cox of the Federal Court of Australia comments:
If there are substantial common issues, it is generally good policy
for the judge to ensure these issues are considered first. Once the
common issues are decided, the litigation will probably be resolved.
If the applicant fails on the major common issues, it is likely that the
proceeding will have to be dismissed; so there will be no need to
consider individual damages claims. If the applicant succeeds on
the major common issues, the defendant is likely to wish to settle
the damages claims, and so avoid further legal costs."18
The Australian federal rule gives class members a right to "opt out"
after notice has been given, in consonance with the American rule." l9
There are differences, however, among the various Australian states.
The state of South Australia provides that one will be a member of a
class unless he "opts out," 20 while the state of Victoria requires that
"all persons represented must give written consent, which must be
filed at the same time as the originating application, and the repre-
sented persons must be named in the originating process."' 121 Notice
procedures are similar to the American procedures, requiring individ-
ual notice when practicable, but allowing publication when
necessary. 122
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
116. Wilcox, supra note 112, at 2.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
118. Wilcox, supra note 112, at 3.
119. See supra text accompanying note 34.
120. Sup. Cr. R. 34 (SA).
121. Supreme Court Act. 1986, §§ 34, 35 & 18.02 (Vict.).
122. Wilcox. supra note 112, at 3-4.
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The application and final court order must "describe or otherwise
identify" the group members.1 23 Class definitions under the Austra-
lian federal rule have not been subjected to the same scrutiny applied
in American practice, with the courts applying pragmatic standards as
to whether the definition is sufficiently definite. Thus, classes might
be defined in terms of persons injured by an environmental condition
or defective product with the details concerning the identity of class
members left to later stages of the proceedings.1 24
Procedures governing settlement, establishment of a fund for distri-
bution of damages, appeals, and costs are specifically provided in the
Australian federal rule. Like the American rule, settlements must be
approved by the court. However, American problems with unfair or
collusive settlements have not arisen. There has been discussion of
adding more specific provisions regarding settlement, perhaps in an-
ticipation of the kind of problems experienced in the United States. 25
Although the Australian federal rule provides a broad and liberal
mechanism for representative proceedings, one feature of the Austra-
lian legal system provides a substantial deterrent to its use. Under the
"loser pays" rule, 126 the plaintiffs in a representative proceeding will
be liable to pay the other side's attorney's fees if they lose (the absent
class members, however, cannot be required to pay). 27 Attorney Pe-
ter Cashman comments that "the representative applicant must be
aware of the potential adverse cost consequences of losing the litiga-
tion." 128 However, the Australian federal rule provides that attorneys
cannot be subjected to "loser pays" demands. Representative plain-
tiffs who qualify for legal aid are unlikely to be subjected to attorney's
fees cost shifting. Cashman notes:
[I]f legal aid is potentially available (which is unlikely in the present
economic and political climate), the representative applicant should
be able to satisfy appropriate means test requirements if they are
applicable. In some jurisdictions legal aid may be granted, indepen-
dently of the means test, if certain public interest or test case re-
quirements are met.129
It is interesting that despite the risk of being saddled with paying
the other side's attorney's fees, individuals are increasingly willing to
123. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, §§ 33H(l)(a), 33ZB (Austl.).
124. See actions cited in Cashman. supra note 106. at 4: Dompter v. Mobil Oil Austl. (2000)
(Fed. Ct. Austl.) VG27 of 2000 (action arising out of a contaminated aviation fuel): Spice v.
Pacific Dunlop Ltd & Ors, N1027 of 1996 (action arising out of defective pacemaker leads).
125. See Cashman, supra note 106, at 20.
126. See Sherman, supra note 77, at 1863-77.
127. Wilcox, supra note 112. at 5.
128. Cashman. supra note 106. at 6.
129. Id.
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serve as representative plaintiffs. Justice Murray Wilcox gives as pos-
sible reasons for this that others may be "contributing to a fund to
finance the case" or that "a large claim, on behalf of many people, is
more likely to be taken seriously and settled than a claim by just one
person."1 30 But the "loser pays" rule would seem to be a disincentive
to robust representative proceedings in Australia, and there is consid-
erable discussion as to how it might be reconciled with class actions.
V. CANADIAN CLASS PROCEEDINGS
Canada adopted what are called "class proceedings" later than Aus-
tralia, and like Australia, it has followed the American model with a
few differences. Quebec legislation in 1978 provided for class pro-
ceedings, 131 but they were rarely used.132 In 1982, the Ontario Law
Reform Commission issued a Report on Class Actions, expressing the
objectives of affording greater access to justice, improving judicial ef-
ficiency, and achieving behavioral modification among manufacturers
and other entities. 133 Class proceedings "became a major force in Ca-
nada with the passage of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act in 1995134
and the subsequent British Columbia Class Proceedings Act in 1995135
(which in many, but not all respects, mirrors the Ontario
legislation)."' 36
Five provinces now have class proceedings (Quebec, Ontario, Brit-
ish Columbia, Newfoundland & Labrador, and Saskatchewan), 37 and
proposals have been made for adopting them in the Federal Courts of
Canada, Manitoba, and Alberta. 138 Alberta has an old style "repre-
sentative action," but not a class action, rule. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court of Canada, in a 2001 decision, 139 held that in the absence
of comprehensive legislation, the courts should fill the void under
130. Wilcox. supra note 112, at 5.
131. QUEBEC CODE CiV. P., R.S.Q., ch. C-25. § 1000 (1978) (Can.).
132. Garry D. Watson. Class Actions: ITe Canadian Experience 4 (presented to the Supreme
Court of Indonesia/Indonesian Center for Environmental Law International Conference on
Class Action Procedures and Their Implementation in the Indonesian Courts, Feb. 18-20, 2(102).
133. ONTARIo LAW REFORM COMMISSION. REPORT ON CLASS Acq'IONS. in 3 SUMMARY OF
RECCOMENDAiTONS § 56 (1982).
134. Class Proceedings Act. S.O.. ch. 6 (1992) (Can.).
135. Class Proceedings Act. S.B.C.. ch. 21 (1995) (Can.).
136. Watson. supra note 132, at 4.
137. QUEBEC CODE CIv. P.. R.S.Q., ch. C-25. § 1000 (1978) (Can.): Ontario Class Proceedings
Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992) (Can.): British Columbia Class Proceedings Act. S.B.C.. ch. 21 (1995)
(Can.): Class Actions Act. S.N.L.. ch. C-18.1 (2001) (Newfoundland & Labrador): The Class
Actions Act. S.S.. ch. C-12.01 (2001) (Saskatchewan).
138. Watson, supra note 132. at 13.
139. W. Can. Shopping Cent. v. Dutton. 121101] S.C.R. 534. See also Hollick v. Toronto, [2001]
S.C.C. 68: Rumley v. British Columbia. [20011 S.C.C. 69.
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their inherent power to establish rules of practice and procedure.
Viewing the class action as an important procedural tool to insure ac-
cess to justice, it ruled that it should be allowed under the representa-
tive action rule so long as the class is capable of clear definition, issues
of law or fact are common to all class members, success for one class
member means success for all, the representative adequately repre-
sents the interests of the class, and there are no countervailing consid-
erations that outweigh the benefits of class treatment. In addition,
"because the courts (particularly in Ontario) have permitted national
classes (i.e., actions in which the class as defined is not limited to On-
tario residents, but any Canadian resident), the effect has been to ex-
tend the class action regime even to those provinces that have not
enacted class action legislation."'' 40
Canadian class proceedings follow the American model by relying
upon "lawyer-entrepreneurs to initiate and drive class actions, [and]
allowing lawyers to risk non-payment for losing cases in the hopes of
recovering substantial court-awarded contingency fees when the cases
are successful." 141 Professor Garry Watson comments that "in certain
respects the Canadian legislation is more liberal in facilitating class
actions than its American counterpart.' 1 42 Under the Canadian rules,
there must be an identifiable class of two or more persons; the claims
must raise common issues; class proceedings must be the preferable
procedure; and the representative plaintiff must fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class, not have a conflict, and have a
workable plan for the action.
Notice of certification and any settlement "is normal but not
mandatory."' 143 Canada follows the American practice of requiring
class members to "opt out" or be bound by the judgment. Like the
United States, but not Australia, a court must certify a class, and this
is usually the battleground for defendants' challenges to class proceed-
ings. Although some two hundred class actions have been filed in On-
tario since 1993 (a tiny number by American standards), 44 Professor
Watson notes that courts have sometimes "refused certification for
reasons having little to do with the statutory criteria-judges identify
an action as a 'bad class action."1 45 The reasons given have a familiar
ring to an American-lack of commonality, too numerous individual
140. See Watson, supra note 132. at 7.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id. at 9.
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issues, 146 or oral misrepresentations made to different class members
by different agents. 147
Not surprisingly, many of the major class actions in the consumer
and product liability areas that have been filed in the United States
have spilled over to Canada. Thus, large class actions involving breast
implants, 148 pacemakers, 149 and Hepatitis C-contaminated blood 50
have been prosecuted on behalf of Canadian citizens in Canadian
courts. American lawyers have sometimes succeeded in including for-
eign citizens in class actions in American courts (attractive because of
American jury verdicts), but Canadian-only class actions are often
counterparts to similar suits against the same companies in the United
States.
Canadian class action settlements have not drawn the same level of
criticism as have settlements in the United States, but Canadian courts
recognize the possible tradeoffs of defense counsel's desire to define
settlement classes as broadly as possible and the desire of plaintiffs'
counsel for substantial attorney's fees. Professor Watson notes that
Canadian courts
are still not sufficiently aware of potential conflicts of interest, or of
the potential for the parties in mass tort cases to "sell out" future
claimants in favor of present claimants (which is now a well recog-
nized problem in the United States), but early indications show that
Canadian courts are perhaps doing a better job of supervising the
approval of settlements than are their U.S. counterparts. 15 1
For example, a court refused to approve a $1.5 billion settlement in
the Hepatitis C class litigation until changes were made.152
Perhaps the most striking difference between Canadian and Ameri-
can class action practice is in the size of attorney's fees received by
class counsel. In the Hepatitis C case, plaintiffs' counsel were
awarded fees in the 2-4% range, although fees more closely approxi-
mating the American range of 25% have sometimes been awarded by
courts in British Columbia and Quebec. 53
146. See Rosedale Motors Inc. v. Petro-Canada Inc.. [1998] 42 O.R.3d 776.
147. See Williams v. Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Can., [20001 O.J. 3821 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), 100
A.C.W.S.3d 387 (Can.) (denying certification in "vanishing premium" case against insurance
company). As in the United States, the same class might still be certified for settlement. See
Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., [1998] 40 O.R.3d 776 (certifying "'vanishing premium"
class action for settlement).
148. See Serwaczek v. Med. Eng'g Corp., [1996] 3 C.P.C.4th 386.
149. See Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary (Can.) Ltd.. [1995] 129 D.L.R.4th 110.
150. See Parsons v. Can. Red Cross Soc'y. [19991 40 C.P.C.4th 151 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 101
A.C.W.S.3d 694.
151. Watson. supra note 132. at 10.
152. Parsons. 40 C.P.C. 4th at 10 n.76.
153. Watson. supra note 132. at 11.
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Like other "loser pays" countries around the world, Canada's fee
shifting rule can have an adverse effect on class actions. Canadian
class action rules provide that, if the class loses, only the representa-
tive plaintiff is liable for the defendant's attorney's fees and costs.
However, the degree and conditions of liability vary among the prov-
inces. Ontario allows costs to be ordered against the representative
plaintiff unless it finds that the action was a "test case, raised a novel
point of law or involved a matter of public interest." 15 4 Ontario has a
Class Proceedings Fund to relieve representative plaintiffs from liabil-
ity for defendants' costs, but it has been called "a failure in that, due
to inadequate financing, it has given funding to very few class actions
(approximately six to date)."' 155 Quebec now requires only nominal
costs to be awarded against the class representative.15 6 British Colum-
bia is the most lenient, having adopted a recommendation of the On-
tario Law Reform Commission making the class representative liable
for costs only if the action is "frivolous or vexatious."'' 5 7 Canada, like
Australia, continues to struggle with the problem of unduly disincen-
tivizing persons from becoming representative plaintiffs in class ac-
tions through the application of the "loser pays" rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The pace of experimentation by other countries with group, repre-
sentative, or class litigation devices has increased enormously in re-
cent years. This has resulted in studies and proposals in those
countries that are likely to provide interesting comparative opportuni-
ties for Americans. Among the most criticized features of the Ameri-
can class action are the self-appointed nature of class representatives,
the procedure by which one is a class member unless he affirmatively
"opts out," the vague standards for determining whether there is ade-
quate cohesiveness between class members, the preference given to
"negative value" class actions, the strong incentives for attorney's fees
and entrepreneurial litigation, and unfair or collusive settlements.
These aspects are being dealt with in differing ways by the other coun-
tries that have moved towards group litigation or representative pro-
ceedings. Now that the class action can no longer be said to be an
exclusively American device, there is a potentially rich source of com-
parative study and experimentation that should benefit all countries
involved.
154. Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 § 31(1) (1992) (Can.).
155. Watson. supra note 132, at 6.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Id.
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